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ABSTRACT: Christine Korsgaard bases her interpretation of personal identity upon the 
notion of moral agency and thereby refutes the Reductionist thesis of Derek Parfit. 
Korsgaard indicates that actions and choices, from the practical standpoint, must be viewed 
as having agents and choosers. This is what makes them our own actions and choices as well 
as contributes to the process of self-constitution. Personal identity as the chooser of our 
desires and author of our actions can be thought of as the common denominator between 
Korsgaard and Wang Yangming (王陽明); for liang-zhi (良知) is none other than the agency 
that acts as the capacity for moral judgment and the motivation of performing moral actions. 
Given liang-zhi is the authentic self that make laws for us, our true identities are exhibited in 
the performance of moral behaviors. Moreover, further engagement between the two sides 
reveals that Wang’s characterizations of liang-zhi, particularly those of practical experience, 
law-embodying identity, and zhi-zhi (致知) can be seen as both a complement to Korsgaard’s 
practical standpoint argument and an approach of consummating self-constitution.. 
 
Keywords: personal identity, moral agency, practical standpoint, liang-zhi, self-constitution, 
zhi-zhi 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
When it comes to the comparative study between Chinese and Western philosophies, 
one of the crucial issues has always been how to find an appropriate medium that 
serves as the common problem of the two sides. In this article, I try to argue that 
moral agency can be one of the intermediaries of choice. 
 Christine Korsgaard bases her interpretation of personal identity, for the most part, 
upon the notion of moral agency and thereby refutes the Reductionist thesis of Derek 
Parfit. I intend to begin by articulating four aspects of this debate: (1) what is personal  
identity, (2) division or integration of consciousness, (3) external intervention or 
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internal decision, and (4) looking at people from theoretical or practical point of view. 
In essence, Parfit’s view is that personal identity just involves physical and 
psychological continuity. This can be described in an impersonal way and without 
claiming that experiences are had by a person. Korsgaard points out that Parfit’s 
arguments depend on viewing the person primarily as a locus of experience, whereas 
different conclusions will be reached if we regard persons primarily as agents. 
Korsgaard notes that as rational beings we might view ourselves from two different 
standpoints, the theoretical and the practical. From the theoretical standpoint, an 
action may be viewed as just another experience, but from the practical point of view, 
actions and choices must be viewed as having agents and choosers. And it is this 
important feature of our sense of our identity and the process of self-constitution that 
Parfit’s account leaves out. 
It is apparent that Personal identity as the chooser of our desires and author of our 
actions can be thought of as the common denominator between Korsgaard and 
Confucianism. Take Wang Yangming (王陽明) as an example, he asserts that a 
person behaves as both an agent and chooser in that human beings are endowed with 
liang-zhi (良知). Firstly, liang-zhi is precisely the agency that responds to moral 
situations by originating our moral actions. Secondly, this response concurs with the 
immediate judgment of the sense of right and wrong, urging moral agents to do what 
is right and repel what is wrong, thus a chooser. For Wang, it is precisely liang-zhi 
that acts as one’s personal identity and thus one’s authentic self. 
Moreover, I will argue, when putting into perspective their respective discourse, 
we are moving toward a more productive engagement. For one thing, Wang proposes 
a way of practical justification that can be used to reinforce Korsgaard’s argument of 
practical standpoint. For another, Korsgaard’s withdrawal from the metaphysical 
dimension of Kant’s ethics, to a certain extent, highlights the theoretical plausibility 
of liangzhi in virtue of its metaphysical and universal status. Finally, it is noted that 
Wang’s thesis of zhi-zhi suggests an approach by which we are able to steer the 
process of self-constitution to the right path and make it a success.1 
 
2. MORAL AGENCY AND PERSONAL IDENTITY 
 
CONTENTION 1: WHAT IS PERSONAL IDENTITY 
 
As an advocate of utilitarianism, Parfit tries to bolster its plausibility via the 
                                                
1 It is worth noting that Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kant has been involving in the raging debate 
between moral realism and constructivism. As a result, there have been certain criticisms leveled 
against her constructivist approach. Despite that this article starts with Korsgaard’s discourse of 
personal identity and moral agency as well as sees it as the common ground of interpreting liang-zhi, it 
is not my intention here to count Wang among the ranks of a constructivist. On the other hand, the 
main theme of this article is on how it is possible that we justify the existence of personal identity via 
the illustration of moral agency. And this can be done, as it were, without being premised on either 
realism or constructivism. Most importantly, as will be clarified later, at bottom Wang’s thesis cannot 
be seen as constructivism in Korsgaard’s sense. 
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Reductionist view of personal identity, according to which the existence of a person 
simply consists in the existence of his brain and body as well as a series of physical 
and mental events. As opposed to that, he argues, if someone claims that a person is a 
separately existing entity or a separate, further fact that is distinct from those events, 
then he is a Non-Reductionist. On the Non-Reductionist view, a person is a separately 
existing entity, distinct from his brain and body, and his experiences. On the best-
known version of this view, a person is a Cartesian Ego. On the Reductionist view 
that Parfit defends, persons exist. But persons are not separately existing entities. The 
existence of a person, during any period, just consists in the existence of brain and 
body, the thinking of his thoughts, the doing of his deeds, and the occurrence of many 
other physical and mental events (Parfit 1984, 275). 
  Technically speaking, Parfit could agree that persons exist and are thinkers and 
agents instead of thoughts and acts, inasmuch as it is not interpreted as an entity in the 
Non-Reductionist sense, particularly a Cartesian Ego. A Reductionist can admit that, 
in this sense, a person is what has experiences, or the subject of experiences. “This is 
true because of the way in which we talk. What a Reductionist denies is that the 
subject of experiences is a separately existing entity, distinct from a brain and body, 
and a series of physical and mental events” (Parfit 1984, 223).  
  In addition to that, Parfit indicates that our identity over time just involves (a) 
Relation R—psychological connectedness and/or psychological continuity, either 
with the normal cause or with any cause, provided (b) that there is no different person 
who is R-related to us as we once were (Parfit 1984, 216). For Parfit, when we are 
talking about personal identity, we are actually referring to Relation R, which can be 
described in an impersonal way and without claiming that experiences are had by a 
person. A Reductionist also claims that personal identity is not what matters. Personal 
identity just involves certain kinds of connectedness and continuity, when these hold 
in a one-one form. These relations are what matters (Parfit 1984, 275). 
 Overall, Parfit’s reasoning is based on the description and explanation of our 
sensory impressions and psychological experiences. However, supposing we explore 
further the ground or foundation of such experiences, we might well have a 
diametrically opposed view on this issue. It is exactly the approach Korsgaard adopts 
and thereby comes to the conclusion that our agency can be regarded as being 
expressive of the characteristic of personal identity. Korsgaard argues that from a 
moral point of view, it is important not to reduce agency to a mere form of experience. 
It is important because our conception of what a person is depends in a deep way on 
our conception of ourselves as agents. For that matter, her argument is directed 
against the views about personal identity advanced by Derek Parfit. The latter’s 
arguments depend on viewing the person primarily as a locus of experience. As 
opposed to this, Korsgaard stresses, if we regard persons primarily as agents, we will 
reach different conclusions both about the nature of personal identity and about its 
moral implications (Korsgaard 1996, 364). 
 Contrary to Parfit’s sense experience approach, Korsgaard emphasizes the moral 
dimension of human actions so that we could discover our personal identity through 
the experience of being a moral agent. Furthermore, in response to Parfit’s critique of 
 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 6.1 (2015)  CHANG 
6 
metaphysics, she maintains that the justification of personal identity can be done on 
account of moral practice, not metaphysics. “Your conception of yourself as a unified 
agent is not based on a metaphysical theory, nor on a unity of which you are 
conscious. Its grounds are practical” (Korsgaard 1996, 369).  
 
CONTENTION 2: DIVISION OR INTEGRATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
As far-fetched as it may seem, Parfit comes up with a series of arguments to support 
his reductionism. At first, he starts with some recent medical cases, the effect of “two 
separate spheres of consciousness”, to prove that our psychological continuity does 
not have to be premised on personal identity. He indicates that many psychological 
tests show the same two essential features. When someone’s hemispheres of the brain 
have been disconnected, in seeing what is in the left half of his visual field, such a 
person is quite unaware of what he is now seeing in the right half of his visual field, 
and vice versa. And in the center of consciousness in which he sees the left half of his 
visual field, and is aware of what he is doing with his left hand, this person is quite 
unaware of what he is doing with his right hand, and vice versa. In this respect, a 
person can be said to have divided minds (Parfit 1984, 245-246). And given that 
people’s hemispheres have been disconnected in these cases of divided minds, they 
have two streams of consciousness, in each of which they are unaware of the other. 
We might claim that, in such a case, there are two different people in the same body 
or there is a single person with two streams of consciousness (Parfit 1984, 276).   
 Based on these cases, Parfit further proposes an imagined case where each half of 
my brain is successfully transplanted into another body. Each of the resulting people 
will have half of my brain, and will be fully psychologically continuous with me. And 
he asks a question: shall I be one of these two people, or the other, or neither? Parfit 
considers it an empty question and asserts that these are merely different descriptions 
of the same outcome (Parfit 1984, 278-279). In other words, these cases proves that 
the notion of “I” or “self”, according to Parfit, is simply not amenable to examination.   
 As to the cases of divided minds, we can always raise a question: what happens if 
they conflict with each other? What really matters is not how many streams of 
consciousness can be divided, but how they can be perceived and integrated at all. 
They must be, after all, perceived and unified by a capacity that effectively grasps the 
conscious process. When it comes to personal identity, we can always concentrate on 
the unifying force behind consciousness, that is, the unity of agency. Korsgaard holds 
that communication and functional integration do not require a common subject of 
conscious experience. What they do require, however, is the unity of agency. And 
there are two aspects of this unity. First, there is the raw practical necessity. Sharing a 
common body, the two hemispheres of my brain, or my various psychic functions, 
must work together. The “phenomenon” of the unity of consciousness is nothing 
more than the lack of any perceived difficulty in the coordination of psychic functions. 
To be sure, when I engage in psychic activities deliberately, I regard myself as the 
subject of these activities. I think, I look, I try to remember. And this has to do with 
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the second element of the unity of agency, the unity inherent in deliberative 
standpoint. I regard myself as the employer of my psychic capacities in much the 
same way that I regard myself as the arbiter among my conflicting desires (Korsgaard 
1996, 377). 
 The unity of agency is used by Korsgaard to explain identity at any given time, 
which consists of two elements. For one thing, there is the raw necessity of 
eliminating conflicts among your various motives. Even though we accept Parfit’s 
cases of persons with split brains, a unified agency is still needed. Imagine that the 
right and left halves of your brain disagree about what to do. Suppose that they do not 
try to resolve their differences, but each merely sends motor orders, by way of the 
nervous system, to your limbs. Since the orders are contradictory, the two halves of 
your body try to do different things. Unless they can come to an agreement, both 
hemispheres of your brain are ineffectual. You are a unified person at any given time 
because you must act, and you have only one body with which to act (Korsgaard 1996, 
369-370). 
 The second element of this pragmatic unity is the unity implicit in the standpoint 
from which you deliberate and choose. When you deliberate, it is as if there were 
something over and above all your desires, something that is you, and that chooses 
which one to act on, rather than just waiting to see which one wins. “This means that 
there is some principle or way of choosing that you regard as expressive of yourself, 
and that provides reasons that regulate your choices among your desires. This does 
not require that your agency be located in a separately existing entity or involve a 
deep metaphysical fact. Instead, it is a practical necessity imposed upon you by the 
nature of the deliberative standpoint” (Korsgaard 1996, 370). For Korsgaard, the 
unity of consciousness is simply an instance of the unity of agency. The unity of 
agency acts as the unifying force that enables us to regard our thoughts or actions as 
expressive of my intention and willingness. “That is to say: to regard some movement 
of my mind or my body as action, I must see it as an expression of myself as a whole, 
rather than as a product of some force that is at work on me or in me” (Korsgaard 
2009, 18). 
 
CONTENTION 3: EXTERNAL INTERVENTION OR INTERNAL DECISION 
 
Korsgaard notes that there is a common thread as to all the cases of Parfit’s so-called 
divided minds insofar as personal identity is damaged due to the intervention of 
external impact like surgeries. As a matter of fact, what really counts is not whether 
there are drastic changes or not, but whether these changes are initiated by the person 
himself or not. It is significant, Korsgaard indicates, that writers on personal identity 
often tell stories about mad surgeons who make changes in our memories or 
characters by means of surgical intervention. But surely part of what creates the sense 
of lost identity is that the person is changed by intervention, from the outside. 
However, the stories might affect us differently if we imagined the changes initiated 
by the person himself, as a result of his own choice. “You are not a different person 
just because you are very different. Authorial psychological connectedness is 
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consistent with drastic changes, provided those changes are the results of actions by 
the person herself or reactions for which she is responsible” (Korsgaard 1996, 379-
380). That is to say, drastic changes do not necessarily threaten to destroy personal 
identity. Provided a person is changed by his own choice other than intervention from 
the outside, he is still identified with himself despite the fact that he is very different 
from what he once was.  
 After establishing that the crux of personal identity lies in the voluntary choice of 
a person, Korsgaard notes that whenever we act, we are actually constituting 
ourselves as the author of our actions and the person who we really are. Accordingly, 
an action in the moral sense is one that is characteristic of self-constitution: 
 
For an action is a movement attributable to an agent as its author, and that means that 
whenever you choose an action—whenever you take control of your own movements—
you are constituting yourself as the author of that action, and so you are deciding who to 
be. Human beings therefore have a distinct form of identity, a norm-governed or practical 
form of identity, for which we are ourselves responsible. As a rational being, as a rational 
agent, you are faced with the task of making something of yourself, and you must regard 
yourself as a success or a failure insofar as you succeed or fail at this task. (Korsgaard 
2009, Preface, xi-xii) 
 
For Korsgaard, identity is not the kind of a prior unity in the agent, an integrity 
already achieved. It is precisely embodied or manifested in what you choose and do. 
She argues that “in the relevant sense there is no you prior to your choices and actions, 
because your identity is in a quite literal way constituted by your choices and 
actions”(Korsgaard 2009, 19). On account that“it is in choosing your actions that you 
create that identity. What this means is that you constitute yourself as the author of 
your actions in the very act of choosing them” (Korsgaard 2009, 20). It explains why 
the identity achieved by self-constitution is a kind of “practical identity,” which is “a 
description under which you value yourself and find your life worth living and your 
actions to be worth undertaking. Conceptions of practical identity include such things 
as roles and relationships, citizenships, memberships in religious or ethnic groups, 
causes, vocations, professions and offices” (Korsgaard 2009, 20). In other words, 
practical identity is fashioned by the choices and actions of a certain person that 
serves as the insignia expressing his profession and vocation, role and relationship in 
the society as well as everything that is characteristic of him. 
 
CONTENTION 4: THEORETICAL OR PRACTICAL POINT FO VIEW 
 
In essence, Parfit has been trying to focus our attention on the content of experiences, 
rather than on the person, the subject of experience. To debunk the myth of the 
subject of experience, he asserts that “we could not tell, from the content of our 
experiences, whether we really are aware of the continued existence of a separately 
existing subject of experiences” (Parfit 1984, 224). And when we have had a series of 
thoughts, the most that we are aware of is the psychological continuity of our stream 
of consciousness. Armed with this approach, he proposes that it is only the nature of 
 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 6.1 (2015)  CHANG 
9 
what happens which is morally important, not to whom it happens (Parfit 1995, 495). 
He starts off by resorting to sense perception and the surgical effect of “two separate 
spheres of consciousness.” According to which, he claims that what actually exists is 
a series of physical and psychological events in that we are not directly aware of the 
existence of any separate entity, the subject of experiences, a person or self. He even 
tries to refute “the first-person mode of presentation” by stressing that in a dream, I 
might seem to see myself running towards this point of view. Since it is myself that I 
seem to see running in this direction, this direction cannot be towards myself. I might 
say that I seem to see myself running towards the seer’s point of view (Parfit 1984, 
221-223). At this stage of analysis, we can see that Parfit pushes it to the limit by 
endorsing the reduction of myself into a seer in terms of the holder of sensory 
perception. 
Contrary to this approach, Korsgaard invokes the Kantian twofold standpoint of 
looking at people from both theoretic and practical dimensions. And it is only through 
the practical standpoint can we discover personal identity. When we look at our 
actions from the theoretical standpoint, our concern is with their explanation and 
prediction. Alternatively, when we view them from the practical standpoint, our 
concern is with their justification and choice. These two relations to our actions are, 
according to Korsgaard, equally legitimate, inescapable, and governed by reason, but 
they are separate. Kant does not assert that it is a matter of theoretical fact that we are 
agents, that we are free, and that we are responsible. Rather, we must view ourselves 
in these ways when we occupy the standpoint of practical reason— that is, when we 
are deciding what to do. “This follows from the fact that we must regard ourselves as 
the causes—the first causes—of the things that we will. And this fundamental attitude   
is forced upon us by the necessity of making choices, regardless of the theoretical or 
metaphysical facts” (Korsgaard 1996: 378). 
 In order to fortify her reasoning, Korsgaard differentiates between two kinds of 
facts, viz., theoretical and practical. From the theoretical standpoint, an action may be 
viewed as just another experience, and the assertion that it has a subject may be, as 
Parfit says, “because of the way we talk.” But from the practical point of view, 
actions and choices must be viewed as having agents and choosers. This is what 
makes them our own actions and choices rather than events that befall us. This does 
not mean that our existence as agents is asserted as a further fact, or requires a 
separately existing entity that should be discernible from the theoretical point of view. 
It is rather that from the practical point of view our relationship to our actions and 
choices is essentially authorial: from it, we view them as our own (Korsgaard 1996, 
378). This is a practical fact, not a theoretical one.2 And it is this important feature of 
our sense of our identity that Parfit’s account leaves out. 
                                                
2 Korsgaard also elucidates identity over time from the practical standpoint. The identity over time 
refers to the fact that most of the things we do that matter to us take time. Some of the things we do are 
intelligible only in the context of projects that extend over long periods. This is especially true of the 
pursuit of our ultimate ends. In choosing our careers, and pursuing our friends and family lives, we 
both presuppose and construct a continuity of identity and of agency. It is also true that we think of our 
activities and pursuits as interconnected in various ways; we think that we are carrying out plans of life. 
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3. LIANG-ZHI, MORAL AGENCY, AND PERSONAL IDENTITY 
 
There are already a number of contemporary literatures on Wang Yangming’s 
doctrine that to a certain degree provide us with fruitful and insightful perspectives 
into his theory of liang-zhi. And the majority of them, as if by tacit agreement, focus 
on the interconnection between liang-zhi and knowledge, whether it be perfect or 
original knowledge, moral knowledge, and knowledge how.3 By examining the 
debate between Korsgaard and Parfit, however, we are able to look at Wang’s 
discourse of liang-zhi in a whole new light. If wielded properly, the issue of personal 
identity arguably functions as a desirable junction to the comparative study between 
moral agency and liang-zhi, which will be elaborated below. 
 
3.1 LIANG-ZHI AS AGENCY 
 
As opposed to Parfit’s concentration on sensory perception or psychological 
experiences and hence denial of personal identity, Korsgaard explores personal 
identity through looking at people from the practical standpoint and emphasizes our 
capacity as choosers and agents. This line of thought coincidentally echoes that of 
Confucianism due to the fact that personal identity as the chooser of our desires and 
author of our actions can also be seen as the tenor of Confician moral philosophy. 
Take Wang Yangming as an example. In like manner, he indicates that we must look 
at people from the stance of agents and choosers. Rather than exploring personal 
identity through sense perception, Wang tries to explicate it via reflection upon the 
foundation of our activities or actions, be it physical, mental or even moral. He says: 
 
The master of the body is xin (心). When xin acts as a motivation, it is called yi  (意). The 
ontological ground of yi is liang-zhi (良知), and whatever yi causes one to do is wu (物). 
For example, when yi causes one to serve his parents, then serving his parents is wu. 
When yi causes one to serve his ruler, then serving his ruler is wu. When yi causes one to 
be humane to all people and feel love toward things, then being humane to all people and 
                                                                                                                                      
In order to carry out a rational plan of life, you need to be one continuing person (Korsgaard 1996, 
371-372). 
3 Representative works of this genre include: Ching, Julia (1976), To Acquire Wisdom: the Philosophy 
of Wang Yang-ming (New York: Columbia University Press); Cua, Antonio (1982), The Unity of 
Knowledge and action: A Study in Wang Yangming’s Moral Psychology (Honolulu: Hawaii University 
Press); Frisina, Warren (2002), The Unity of Knowledge and Action: Toward a Nonrepresentational 
Theory of Knowledge (Albany: State University of New York Press); Huang, Yong (2006), “A Neo-
Confucian Conception of Wisdom: Wang Yangming on the Innate Moral Knowledge.” Journal of 
Chinese Philosophy (33) 3: 393-408; Ivanhoe, Philip J. (2002), Ethics in the Confucian Tradition: The 
Thought of Mengzi and Wang Yangming (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company); Nivison, David 
S. (1996), The Ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese Philosophy (Chicago and La Salle, Ill.: 
Open Court); Yang, Xiaomei (2009), “How to Make Sense of the Claim ‘True Knowledge Is What 
Constitutes Action’: A New Interpretation of Wang Yangming’s Doctrine of Unity of Knowledge and 
Action.” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy (8) 2: 173-88, to name just a few. 
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feeling love toward things are wu and when yi causes one to see, hear, speak, and act, 
then each of these is wu. (Chan 1998, 37)4 
 
In this passage, Wang sketches the interrelation of four cardinal concepts of his thesis. 
The general term “xin” (心) refers to one’s state of consciousness that can function as 
either “liang-zhi” (良知) or “yi” (意). What Wang means by “wu” (物) is our 
behaviors or actions. And those actions such as seeing, hearing, speaking, and acting 
fall respectively under the categories of sense perception and physical activities. 
Serving one’s parents and ruler as well as being humane to all people and feeling love 
toward things are moral conducts. And all these activities and conducts arise from yi, 
namely, our motivation or volition. Moreover, liang-zhi is the foundation of yi due to 
its status as the ontological ground of the latter. Wang’s further explanation is that: 
 
Xin is the master of the body. The selfless, acute and discerning nature of xin is liang-zhi 
in its original status. When liang-zhi is influenced by things and events and responds to 
them by motivating us to act, it is called yi. With liang-zhi, there will be yi. Without 
liang-zhi, there will be no yi. Is liang-zhi not the ontological ground of yi? Whenever yi 
acts as the motivation, it results in wu. And so-called wu is exactly an action. When we 
are motivated to serve our parents, then serving our parents is called wu. When we are 
motivated to govern the people, then governing the people is called wu. When we are 
motivated to study, then studying is called wu. When we are motivated to hear a lawsuit, 
then hearing a lawsuit is called wu. With yi, there will be wu; without yi, there will be no 
wu. Is wu not the actualization of yi? (Chan 1998, 176-177)  
 
What Wang means by calling liang-zhi the ontological ground of yi is that liang-zhi is 
the prerequisite for the existence of yi in that yi emerges as the motivation to perform 
a certain act when liang-zhi responds to various situations that befall us. Therefore he 
claims that with liang-zhi, there will be yi; without liang-zhi, there will be no yi. This 
also indicates that wu or an action is the actualization or objectification of yi and 
hence the statement “with yi, there will be wu; without yi, there will be no wu.” Since 
yi, qua motivation or will, can be good or evil, a moral ground is needed in order to 
get it right in case it goes bad. For Confucianism in general, ontological and moral 
ground is one and the same, so not only is liang-zhi the ontological ground, but also 
serves as the moral agency that discerns good motivations from evil ones as well as 
having the impact to sublimate our volition. That also speaks for itself about why 
liang-zhi is the selfless, acute and discerning nature of xin. On balance, we can see 
that the ultimate foundation of all actions or activities is exactly liang-zhi. Wang 
makes it clear that liang-zhi is a kind of agency capable of motivating us to act 
whenever we are interacting with the outside world. And the corresponding 
movements include moral conduct (serving our parents, and in a broader sense, 
governing the people) and non-moral actions (studying, hearing a lawsuit).  
                                                
4 The edition of chuan-xi-lu (傳習錄) upon which my translation is based was compiled by Wing-tsit, 
Chan (陳榮捷). See Chan 1998. His English translation of chuan-xi-lu has been considerably referred 
to during the writing process as well. Also see Chan 1963. 
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3.2 LIANG-ZHI AS CHOOSER AND AUTHENTIC SELF 
 
In response to Parfit’s assertion that we are not directly aware of personal identity, 
Korsgaard holds that personal identity is the moral agency manifested in the action 
we choose, the responsibility we take and so on. With the capacity to discern good 
from bad, liang-zhi is literally a kind of moral agency that alerts us to our selfish 
desires as well as bad thoughts and ideas. Wang claims that “even when erroneous 
thoughts arise, liang-zhi is present. Only because man does not know how to preserve 
it is xin sometimes lost. Even when xin is most darkened and obstructed, liang-zhi is 
clear. Only because man intends not to heed it is xin sometimes obscured” (Chan 
1998, 214). It is apparent that, for Wang, liang-zhi acts as the chooser when we are 
facing a moral situation. Even if we are obsessed with selfishness, desires or impulses, 
liang-zhi is still present despite of being weakened. As long as we heed its instruction, 
our judgment and behavior will be heading back in the right direction.  
 Moreover, liang-zhi not only identifies right and wrong, but also motivates us to 
do the right thing and reject the bad thing. There is a part of human nature that is 
susceptible to desires and selfishness and tends to be blind to our conscience. When 
faced with a choice between right and wrong, the role of liang-zhi as moral agency is 
spurring us to do what we consider as the right thing to do. That is why we are able to 
reach the unity of what we ought to do and what we actually do, which Wang calls 
“zhi-xing-he-yi” (知行合一). Wang cites instances such as filial piety and fraternal 
love to illustrate this unity. “Suppose we say that so-and-so realizes (zhi; 知) filial 
piety and so-and-so realizes fraternal love. They must have actually practiced (xing; 
行) filial piety or fraternal love before they can be said to realize either one of them” 
(Chan 1998, 33). To accept filial piety and fraternal love as a duty is one thing, to put 
these duties into practice is quite another. One realizes what moral agency is all about 
by way of practical experience. In the process of moral practice, we are aware not 
only of sense perception and the lure of desires, but of an inner driving force that is 
immune from their impact and that tells us how to deal with them. It is this moral 
agency that makes us a chooser and agent. And we realize the fact via self-
consciousness other than sensory experience.  
 Aside from that, Wang and Korsgaard read off the same sheet of music insofar as 
they both claim that we express a unique personal identity when acting as the author 
of our movements. According to Korsgaard, the task of self-constitution places us in a 
relationship with ourselves—it means that we interact with ourselves. We make laws 
for ourselves, and those laws determine whether we constitute ourselves well or badly. 
And the only way in which you can constitute yourself well is by governing yourself 
in accordance with universal principles which you can will as laws for every rational 
being (Korsgaard 2009, ⅩⅡ). This type of moral agency enables us to forge our own 
personal identity and literally constitute a sense of self that is different from various 
streams of consciousness. Similarly, Wang asserts that our real identities are 
exhibited in the performance of moral agency. As opposed to the bodily self that 
 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 6.1 (2015)  CHANG 
13 
refers to the physical and biological dimensions of human beings, liang-zhi is the 
authentic self that makes laws for us:  
   
The ontological ground of xin is none other than tianli (天理) and is never out of accord 
of propriety. This is your authentic self. This authentic self is the master of your body. If 
there is no authentic self, there will be no body. It is definitely true that with the authentic 
self, one lives; without it, one dies. If you really want to do something for your bodily 
self, you must make the most of your authentic self and always remember to preserve it 
by being cautious over your own bad thoughts and ideas. (Chan 1998, 146) 
 
In this passage, tian-li, as the ontological ground, is exactly the term denominating 
liang-zhi, which also acts as the source of universal moral principles. With liang-zhi, 
we make moral laws for ourselves. From the moral point of view, liang-zhi, as 
authentic self, must be the master of bodily self, that is, the physical as well as 
physiological properties of human beings. Supposing that we focus only on the bodily 
self, we are merely passively experiencing a series of activities consisting of sensory 
perception, desires, impulses, and so on. On this score, Parfit is totally right when he 
claims that the existence of a person simply consists in the existence of his brain and 
body as well as a series of physical and mental events. Nevertheless, we are not just 
receivers of sensory experiences, but also active choosers that are able to decide how 
to interpret and appropriately cope with things that befall us. This moral agency is 
called the authentic self in that it is the cornerstone of personal identity. If there is no 
authentic self, then we have no moral agency, let alone personal identity. What is left 
would be a series of physical and mental events. That explains why Wang stresses 
that with the authentic self, one lives; without it, one dies. 
 
4. PRACTICAL STANDPOINT, SELF-CONSTITUTION AND LIANG-ZHI 
 
Based on the previous analysis, we can now further reflect on the discourses of both 
Wang and Korsgaard. I will divide my discussion into two parts. The first has to do 
with the comparison and contrast between their views in terms of practical standpoint. 
And the second deals with their divergent attitudes towards metaphysics and 
somewhat different construal regarding self-constitution. Along with this engagement, 
we can see that Wang’s doctrine, to a considerable extent, has the virtue of either 
being a supplement to Korsgaard’s thesis or keeping at bay some of the sticklers the 
latter has to cope with. 
 
4.1 TWO STANDPOINTS ARGUMENT, PRACTICAL JUSTIFICATION AND 
LIANG-ZHI 
 
Korsgaard’s argument of two standpoints is dubbed by Anomaly as “compatibilism”, 
which in turn faces significant epistemological problems. At first, Anomaly claims 
that “if truth is merely perspectival—i.e., relative to one of two equally legitimate 
standpoints which we may occupy—then we can never describe either ourselves or 
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the world as they really are” (Anomaly 2008, 340-341). As to this critical opinion, it 
should be noted that Korsgaard’s two standpoints argument tackles not the issue of 
knowledge or truth, but that of how to look at our actions and choices. Accordingly, it 
is instructive to emphasize that this argument is intended to explain how we are able 
to justify personal identity other than epistemologically claiming that there should be 
a two-fold criterion regarding truth. On this score, this remark has knocked at the 
wrong door. 
 On the other hand, Anomaly also holds that if Korsgaard is to countenance her 
view by distinguishing the justificatory standards of practical beliefs from those of 
theoretical beliefs, “her conclusions are also apparently consistent with the practical 
consequences Parfit draws from his theory of personal identity (Anomaly 2008, 341). 
Provided the way Anomaly deciphers Korsgaard’s practical standpoint is pertinent, 
and given that Parfit also admits that in practice we can talk about person or personal 
identity as long as we keep in mind that these terms simply refer to Relation-R or 
psychological connectedness and continuity, it seems plausible to assert that 
Korsgaard and Parfit are actually saying the same thing. Yet this is still a 
misunderstanding of Korsgaard’s theorizing of the issue. As far as personal identity is 
concerned, Korsgaard claims that it is a practical fact, and that it does actually exist. 
For Parfit, by contrast, personal identity could not be said to actually, but 
pragmatically exist. According to Korsgaard, the point is not so much about which 
option, practical or theoretical beliefs, we choose to look upon personal identity as 
about which would be the appropriate approach to justify personal identity. Korsgaard 
points out that practical standpoint would be the ideal approach to delve into personal 
identity. As opposed to that, if you simply treat our actions and choices as the content 
of perception and object of cognition, it would be intelligible that you could not find 
personal identity. This does not, however, entail that you could justify the non-
existence of it inasmuch as theoretical fact is not the only way to vindicate a 
philosophical point of view. 
 Nevertheless, characterizing Korsgaard’s practical standpoint argument as a kind 
of practical belief, as anomaly does, subtly pinpoints a potential problem in it. In 
some respects, it figures why this argument tends to strike others as resorting to 
unjustified beliefs and thus essentially a type of perspectivism. The dichotomy 
between theoretical and practical facts implies that our choices and actions are 
beyond the scope of theoretical inquiry, as well as succumbing to Parfit’s premise that 
exclusively accredits sense perception or impression as the only criterion of the 
plausibility of a thesis. As such, we can only regard or view ourselves as agents, 
authors of our choices and actions rather than confirming it. As a result, practical fact 
is at best something we presuppose or believe instead of proving theoretically. In this 
regard, this dichotomy threatens to undermine Korsgaard’s argument of two 
standpoints.  
 In our practical experience, we effectively confirm our actions and choices not via 
sense perception and impression, but via the self-consciousness of our actual 
performance of a particular task. One instance of which is to behave morally: you 
establish that you are doing a moral behavior by actually and self-consciously doing it 
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instead of simply observing or describing it. You realize that you are helping a 
drowning person by practically reaching out your hand to that person while yelling 
“grab my hand!” In other words, to do it self-consciously is to affirm it actually. In 
fact, Korsgaard seems to have noticed the self-conscious aspect of agency when 
asserting that rational activity “is essentially a form of self-conscious activity, and it 
is this that leads to the construction of personal identity” (Korsgaard 2009: 42). “To 
act, I have already suggested, is to determine yourself to be the cause of certain end. 
So to act self-consciously is to conceive yourself teleologically—as the cause—that is, 
the first cause—of a certain end. It is to conceive yourself as an agent, as efficacious 
to achieve certain subjectively held ends” (Korsgaard 2009: 41). As such, Korsgaard 
could have proceeded to establish such self-consciousness implicit in practical 
experience as a way of practical justification, defending the legitimacy of practical 
standpoint in its own right. Without this crucial step, the justificatory power of 
practical standpoint would be unable to cross the bridge at the end of the route.  
 As a matter of fact, to endorse practical standpoint need not be at the expense of 
losing its status of theoretical truth. Other than the deduction of two kinds of facts, 
looking at people from twofold standpoint could give rise to the taxonomy between 
two ways of justifying a philosophical viewpoint theoretically: sensory and practical, 
based respectively on sensory experience and practical experience. And the latter 
excels at confronting Parfit’s arguments in that it re-establishes practical experience 
as the legitimate access to theoretical truths. According to this division, practical 
justification is exactly what Prafit’s argumentation leaves out. Practical standpoint 
helps us to rethink the way we look at practical experience, viz. the kind of hands-on 
experience we obtain through practice. In this regard, practical experience is, so to 
speak, a kind of existential experience that can plausibly provide us with theoretical 
truth. They are true insofar as they serve as the constituent parts of our lives and thus 
have justificatory power theoretically. 
 At bottom, Wang’s explanations of zhi-xing-he-yi are those that exemplify 
practical justification. On Wang’s view, “authentic confirmation of liang-zhi (zhen-
zhi; 真知) is manifested in action and unless liang-zhi is acted on, one fails at the task 
of realizing liang-zhi” (Chan 1998, 166). A person is filial when he is doing 
something characteristic of filial piety rather than just talking about it or getting 
someone else to do it. In the state of zhi-xing-he-yi, the will to do something and your 
actual doing it are rolled into one. In the process, practical justification means that 
you can be certain of having this experience inasmuch as you are conscious of it. For 
that matter, an action can be counted as the manifestation of liang-zhi, while liang-zhi 
can be viewed as the state of acting self-consciously. Hence he says that “action is the 
genuine embodiment of liang-zhi, while liang-zhi is the self-consciousness and self-
discernment immanent in action” (Chan 1998, 166).  
 As was mentioned in section 3.2, liang-zhi is a kind of agency capable of 
responding to various situations by motivating us to act. And the corresponding 
actions include moral and non-moral actions such as studying, seeing and hearing. In 
this sense, liang-zhi is not the object of sensory experience or cognition, but what 
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underlies cognitive and objectifying acts such as studying, seeing and hearing. That is 
to say, liang-zhi cannot be cognitively objectified but conversely serves as the 
foundation of every act of objectification. Moreover, given its status as both 
metaphysical principle and agency, the pertinent way to have a grip of liang-zhi is 
none other than its awareness of itself. Liang-zhi, as the ontological ground of xin, is 
beyond any cognitive activities. “The ontological ground of xin is precisely tian-li, In 
light of tian-li is the only one metaphysical principle, it cannot be comprehended via 
thinking and reasoning”5 (Chan 1998, 203). Therefore, Wang distinguishes between 
consideration based upon liang-zhi and selfishness. Liang-zhi is keenly aware of any 
deliberation and consideration based upon it as well as discerns those based upon 
selfishness (Chan 1998, 241). On this score, liangh-zhi is able to grasp the activity of 
itself as well as the content of mental acts of willing (yi; 意). As soon as we act, we 
are conscious of our acting, and we can even go one step further to discern right from 
wrong with regard to the content of our actual acts of willing. The process of grasping 
is the factual event happening in tandem all the time with the functioning of liang-zhi, 
wherein a person manifests his own personal identity. We can be certain of this kind 
of fact, though not via sense perception, but through practical experience. This dual 
activity of grasping could be seen as a kind of practical justification. 
 From Wang’s perspective, right choices and actions are initiated by our moral 
agency, a peculiar type of identity, namely liang-zhi. This can be construed fully 
through our practical experience. Our self-consciousness of practical experience 
(other than the sense perception or impression of it) evidently tells us that it is an 
existential fact, something we experientially confirm as true, instead of a 
presupposition that we simply regard as true. This approach of practical justification 
can be viewed as the complementary argumentation that fills in the missing link of 
practical standpoint characteristic of Kantian ethics. 
 
4.2 HOW CAN SELF-CONSTITUTION BE A SUCCESS: 
METAPHYSICS, PERSONAL IDENTITY AND ZHI-ZHI (致知) 
 
Korsgaard delineates at large the notion of self-constitution and how it will affect our 
appraisals of ourselves. One will regard himself as a success or a failure insofar as 
one succeeds or fails at this task. Now the question is: how can we make self-
constitution a success? As will be clarified in this section, its answer lies in ensuring a 
universalizable, law-embodying identity as well as reinforcing the impact of moral 
agency, both of which seem to be neglected by Korsgaard, whereas highlighting the 
strengths of Wang’s theory of liang-zhi. 
 
 
                                                
5 Deliberation and consideration are premised on the dichotomy between subject and object, which is 
ruled out, according to Confucianism, in the process of self-consummation and realization of the 
ultimate ontological principle, tian-li. That speaks for itself why Wang notes that liang-zhi is beyond 
any deliberation and consideration. 
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4.2.1 METAPHYSICS AND UNIVERSALITY OF IDENTITY 
 
Korsgaard keeps reiterating that we can account for moral agency and personal 
identity without resort to any notions of metaphysics. The justification of either one 
of them is appropriately premised on practical reasons, instead of metaphysical 
reasons. “The need for identification with some unifying principle or way of choosing 
is imposed on us by the necessity of making deliberative choices, not by the 
metaphysical facts” (Korsgaard 1996, 371). On Korsgaard’s view, we are taking a 
superfluous step by invoking metaphysical concepts to bolster personal identity. 
The problem is that Korsgaard’s departure from metaphysics comes at a price. In 
essence, the identity Korsgaard proposes is a “conception of practical identity,” which 
is “a description under which you value yourself and find you life worth living and 
your actions worth undertaking. Conceptions of practical identity include such things 
as roles and relationships, citizenship, membership in ethnic or religious groups, 
causes, vocations, professions, and offices” (Korsgaard 2009, 20). This conception of 
practical identity makes us laws to ourselves. Whether an impulse or a desire could be 
the reason we act on lies in “whether the maxim of acting on it can be willed as a law 
by a being with the identity in question” (Korsgaard 2010, 113). If it can be willed as 
a law, it is a reason. If it cannot be willed as a law, we must reject it. 
What is problematic about this characterization is: it leads to the contradiction 
within Korsgaard’s conception of self-constitution, as well as deviates from her 
adoption of Kant’s self-legislation. As Cohen puts it: 
 
If morality is to do with law, then the liaison between morality and practical identity is 
questionable, since the commitments that form my practical identity need not to be things 
that have the universality characteristic of law. Practical identity is a matter of loyalty and 
identification, and whereas there is indeed such a thing as loyalty to general principles, 
there also exits loyalty to family, to group, to another individual; and no credible 
characterization of what practical identity is, in general terms, would yield a general 
priority for principled over particularistic identifications. (Cohen 1996, 174-175) 
 
For Korsgaard, “most of the self-conceptions which govern us are contingent” 
(Korsgaard 2010, 120); that is to say, practical identity is grounded in contingent 
conditions of a person, such as citizenship, membership in ethnic or religious groups, 
professions and so on. As such, this identity is not able to make us laws to ourselves; 
for the instructions or orders it gives are conditional. Cohen correctly indicates that 
what Korsgaard effectively claims “is not that I be a law to myself, but that I be in 
command of myself. And sometimes the commands that I issue will be singular, not 
universal” (Cohen 1996, 176). Therefore, this conception of practical identity is, at 
best, to be referred to as command-embodying identity other than law-embodying 
identity. On top of that, Given what practical identity offers are not so much universal 
principles as particularistic commands, this in turn conflicts directly with Korsgaard’s 
articulation of self-constitution wherein “the only way in which you can constitute 
yourself well is by governing yourself in accordance with universal principles which 
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you can will as laws for every rational being” (Korsgaard 2009, ⅩⅡ). As a result, 
the “conception of practical identity” inevitably makes self-constitution self-defeating 
on account of the contingency of its social and natural conditions.  
 Thus understood, we may say that for self-constitution to be a success, personal 
identity had better be based upon the type of moral agency that gives universal law. 
On Kant’s part, it refers to pure practical reason, the cornerstone of his metaphysics 
of morals. This universalizable identity distinguishes itself from the particularity and 
volatility of practical identity. Furthermore, the universality of identity is compatible 
with personality on grounds that moral behaviors, which can be seen as the 
embodiment or manifestation of universalizable identity, vary among different people. 
Since there are a wide range of moral behaviors conducted by people, they also 
exhibit various characters, virtues, and accordingly distinct personal identities. 
Practical identities, in Korsgaard’s sense, are in fact the upshot resulted from the 
interaction between this universal moral agency and our particular roles, relationships, 
vocations, etc., where the former guides our choices and actions by referring to the 
latter. In light of this, such universalizable identity is literally the moral identity that 
underlies our practical identities.6 Given that Korsgaard adopts Kant’s autonomy and 
moral law while withdrawing from the metaphysical dimension of his ethics, 
universal moral identity is replaced by practical identity and consequently a 
contradiction within her argumentation of self-constitution appears to be unavoidable. 
  A notable difference between Wang and Korsgaard is that they hold opposite 
attitudes toward metaphysics. Contrary to Korsgaard, Wang explicitly builds his 
theory of liang-zhi on the Archimedean point that moral practice is the crux where 
ethics and metaphysics converge. On one level, liang-zhi is manifested as our moral 
agency; on another, it also acts as the metaphysical ground, according to which 
everything exists. Only by moral acts can we serve as the epitome of metaphysical 
ground. He asserts that “liang-zhi is the source of creation. This creative power 
creates heaven and earth, spiritual beings, and the Lord. They all come from it” (Chan 
1998, 323). Wang makes it clear that liang-zhi is precisely tian-li, the ontological and 
moral ground of all existing things. When liang-zhi propels us to follow its 
instructions and orders, it is as if Heaven (tian; 天) is propelling us to follow Its 
instructions and orders. Once man acts according to liang-zhi, he embodies it in his 
                                                
6 It behooves us to add that Korsgaard also talks about moral identity grounding our practical identities. 
Her characterization of moral identity, however, differs in nature from that of our above analysis. On 
Korsgaard’s view, moral identity is also a kind of practical identity, though at the same time sets itself 
apart in that it acts as the foundation of all the other practical identities. As a human being, a reflective 
animal who needs reasons to act and live, practical identities provide us with those reasons. “Most of 
the time, our reasons for action spring from our more contingent and local identities. But part of the 
normative force of those reasons spring from the value we place on ourselves as human beings who 
need such identities.” In other words, moral identity refers to our common need for having a certain 
practical identity to give us reasons to act and live. In this regard, moral identity is inescapable and 
pervasive. Consequently, “not every form of practical identity is contingent or relative after all: moral 
identity is necessary” (Korsgaard 1996, 120-122). It is apparent that moral identity, on Korsgaard’s 
account, stands for the necessity of having practical identities characteristic of human nature, rather 
than the moral agency that gives universal moral laws.  
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behaviors. In this sense, he can be considered as the manifestation of tian-li. That is 
the very significance of the oneness between Heaven and Man (tian-ren-he-yi; 天人
合一) delineated by Confucianism. 
 On Wang’s account, liang-zhi is literally capable of the task of self-legislation. As 
Wang puts it, “when xin motivates us to be filial to our parents, it gives rise to the 
principle of filial piety. Otherwise, there will be no principle of filial piety. When xin 
motivates us to be loyal to the ruler, it gives rise to the principle of loyalty. Otherwise, 
there will be no principle of loyalty” (Chan 1998: 166-167). Hence, it is appropriate 
to say that liang-zhi per se makes us laws to ourselves. In addition, Wang also 
emphasizes that whenever liang-zhi is manifested as our moral agency, it carries with 
it the characteristic of universality in that this manifestation is invariable anytime and 
anywhere (Chan 1998, 244-245). All of this suggests that what Wang endorses is not 
that I be in command of myself, but that I be a law to myself. As such, liang-zhi is 
markedly qualified as the law-embodying identity. 
 
4.2.2 ZHI-ZHI: REINFORCEMENT OF THE IMPACT OF MORAL AGENCY 
 
With regard to self-constitution, apart from illuminating a universalizable, law-
embodying identity, Wang goes one step further and proposes an account of how we 
can augment the impact of liang-zhi and in turn better fulfill the task of self-
constitution, namely the approach of zhi-zhi (致知).  
As was mentioned above, Parfit just pays attention to the passive side of human 
beings and consequently only sees the existence of brains, bodies as well as Relation 
R—psychological connectedness and/or psychological continuity. Korsgaard is 
squarely at odds with him and points out that we have to be as much concerned with 
the passive and empirical side as with the active and practical side. For Confucianism 
and Wang Yangming alike, in case we do not take notice of the active and practical 
dimension within us, the impact of our moral agency will be attenuating over time. 
Alone with it, our personal identity will also be obscured.  
 Since personal identity is reified in the active and practical character of our moral 
agency, it is instrumental to maintain its impact by striving to do everything in 
accordance with its instructions. To achieve this goal, we must start by following 
through with instructions or commands from liang-zhi, which is called by Wang the 
endeavor of “zhi-zhi” (realizing liang-zhi; 致知). For Wang, the ultimate goal of self-
constitution is to realize through personal experience the original status of xin and 
keep it magnanimous and impartial without the slightest incorrectness. One critical 
modus operandi is: whenever a motive to love the good arises, actually put it into 
practice. Whenever a motive to hate the evil arises, actually put it into practice. (Chan 
1998, 368) In other words, whenever liang-zhi judges something to be good, try to do 
it and vice versa. However, if liang-zhi judges something to be good but you end up 
not doing said thing, or if liang-zhi judges something to be bad but you end up doing 
said thing, your liang-zhi is obscured. And that means you virtually fail at pulling off 
the task of zhi-zhi. (Chan 1998, 368-369) 
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 In the process of zhi-zhi, you are conscious of something over and above all your 
desires, something that is you, and that chooses which option to act on. Wang even 
metaphorizes the impact of liang-zhi by saying that whenever the least desire to act 
out of accord with the rules of propriety germinates and becomes dominant, you will 
feel as though cut with a knife and struck with a needle; the feeling will be unbearable, 
and will not stop until the knife and the needle are removed (Chan 1963, 81)7. To put 
it another way, it is when the moral agency characteristic of “the identity at any given 
time” in Korgaard’s sense is in full force. This approach of reinforcing moral agency 
is what Confucianism has been practicing and improving over time in order to make 
self-constitution a success. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Close examination reveals that Wang and Korsgaard have one thing in common: they 
both endorse the idea of moral agency as the basis of personal identity. We express a 
unique personal identity when acting as the chooser of our desires and the author of 
our movements. Moral agency is precisely the unifying ground on which these roles 
come into play. Our true identities are, so to speak, exhibited and constituted in the 
process of making moral decisions and executing moral actions. On top of that, in 
order for the comparative study between Wang and Korsgaard to be a constructive 
engagement, we further go over both theses in terms of two issues: how to fortify 
practical standpoint and make self-constitution a success.  
 Korsgaard makes the case that personal identity could be established from 
practical standpoint. The dichotomy between practical and theoretical facts, however, 
leads to the conclusion that the former is at best a postulate that cannot be 
theoretically justified. It likewise implies that sense perception or impression is 
accredited as the only legitimate access to theoretical truth. The problem is that 
sensory experience and practical experience alike should be seen as the integral part 
of our existential experience, and thus equally has justificatory power with respect to 
philosophical argumentation. We confirm our practical experience via practical 
justification, that is, the self-consciousness or awareness of our hands-on experience. 
By ensuring the legitimacy of this kind of justification, practical standpoint literally 
reestablishes its status as one of the approaches to theoretical truth. From Wang’s 
perspective, zhi-xing-he-yi makes it clear that moral agency can be justified through 
our practical experience. Confirming the existence of liang-zhi (and accordingly 
personal identity) rests on embodying it in our moral behaviors. Practical justification 
refers to the capacity of liangh-zhi to grasp the activity of itself along with the content 
of mental acts of willing. The self-consciousness of liang-zhi accompanies at all times 
the process of our examining thoughts and motivations, making a choice, and putting 
the instructions of liang-zhi into practice. Practical experience is an existential fact, 
something we experientially confirm as true, other than a presupposition we simply 
                                                
7 This English translation is from IFPL by Wing-tsit, Chan.   
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regard as true. In this score, Wang’s viewpoint can be regarded as a complement to 
Korsgaard’s articulation of practical standpoint. 
 On the other hand, Korsgaard manages to sever the connection between moral 
agency and metaphysics. The consequence of this position results in the contradiction 
between two inextricable parts of self-constitution: self-legislation and practical 
identity, inasmuch as the universality of moral law required by self-legislation 
conflicts with the contingency characteristic of practical identity. For Wang’s part, he 
establishes liang-zhi as the kind of moral agency that gives universal moral laws on 
grounds that it acts as both the manifestation of metaphysical principle and universal 
moral capacity. What Korsgaard actually asserts is a command-embodying identity, 
whereas Wang endorses a law-embodying identity. What is more, Wang proposes an 
approach by which self-constitution will be coming to a good end. We are closing in 
on making self-constitution a success every time we comply with the instruction of 
liang-zhi and put it into practice, which is dubbed by Wang the approach of zhi-zhi.  
 The above analysis then brings up the issue of their divergence that keeps our 
discussion from embroiling in the debate between moral realism and moral 
constructivism. First, in light of liang-zhi’s status as a metaphysical entity rather than 
a mere procedure, Wang and Korsgaard disagree over the nature of moral agency. 
Suffice it to say that Wang cannot be seen as a constructivist in Korgaard’s sense. 
Next, as was indicated by Formosa, the taxonomic structure of moral realism and 
constructivism is itself contested and imprecise; for constructivism can be read as 
rejecting realism (Habermas), bracketing realism (O’Neill), and as a specific form of 
realism, namely procedural (Korsgaard) or weak (Milo) realism (Formosa 2011, 171-
172).8 Aside from that, Korsgaard’s procedural constructivism falls, as Formosa 
points out, under the category of ‘all the way down’ constructivists, who claims that 
the content of the moral law and its rational bindingness rest on actual act of willing 
on behalf of those bound by the law (Formosa 2011, 179). Given Wang sees actual 
act of willing as yi, instead of liang-zhi, it is even more evident that Wang does not 
hold a so-called constructivist view such as Korsgaard’s. 
 In conclusion, by focusing on the notion of personal identity and moral agency, 
we explore the potential of accounting for Wang Yangming’s theory of liang-zhi in 
                                                
8 In more detail, if we talk about realism in the weak sense (the viewpoint that some moral judgments 
are true), it follows that this realism is compatible with any types of constructivists. When it comes to 
realism in the strong sense (the viewpoint that there exists an “independent moral order” to which our 
true moral judgments correctly correspond), however, the incompatibility is obvious in the case of ‘all 
the way down’ constructivists other than not ‘all the way down’ constructivists. It is because both not 
‘all the way down’ constructivist and his strong realist counterpart claim, contra ‘all the way down’ 
constructivists’ construal, that the content of the moral law and its rational bindingness is independent 
of any actual act of willing on behalf of those bound by the law. Their disagreement is, strictly 
speaking, about whether the value of rational agency can be given independently of the procedure of 
lawmaking. For not ‘all the way down’ constructivists, the moral law or categorical imperative is a 
procedure for constructing valid maxims and thereby for conferring objective goodness on self-chosen 
permissible ends, whereas strong realists starts with an account that the value of rational agency must 
be given independently of the procedure and only if this can be done will the categorical imperative be 
properly grounded (Formosa 2011, 172-174). 
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the context of contemporary debates between Korsgaard and Parfit. In this processs, 
the consensus between Wang and Korsgaard is clear to us and the former’s discourse 
of liang-zhi, in one way or another, can be viewed as a complement to Korsgaard’s 
formulation of practical standpoint and self-constitution. In addition, one added 
benefit of this comparative project is that there are the similarities shared not only by 
Wang and Korsgaard, but also by Wang and Kant in terms of arguing for 
universalizable, law-embodying identity as well as the moral approach to metaphysics, 
among others. For that matter, now we might well be simply scratching the surface of 
a wealth of productive comparative studies.9  
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9 One anonymous referee of this article points out that Wang seems to have more in common with 
Kant than Korsgaard does. The similarities shared by Kant’s Pure Practical Reason and Wang’s liang-
zhi include these. (1) Every rational agent possesses it; it is the same in everyone. It cannot change or 
be lost. (2) It is innate, not acquired. One need only exercise it. (3) To exercise it means one is free of 
control by one’s selfish desires and inclinations. (4) If one is not determined to act and think by one’s 
inclinations and desires, one is lead to be moral by it. (5) It is a source of completely reliable moral 
knowledge. (6) It is practical in nature, and can respond morally and correctly in any practical situation. 
(7) They presuppose complex metaphysics that many contemporary analytic philosophers question, 
Kant’s presupposition of three practical postulates, for example. (8) Our true self is found in it. Given 
these similarities, the reviewer claims, there is significant material for a comparative project between 
Wang and Kant as well as between where Wang and Kant differ from contemporary Kantians. This 
proposition, in effect, not only sheds new light on how to look at the debate between contemporary 
Kantians, but echoes, for the most part, the interpretation of Kant’s autonomy in the works of Mou 
Zong-san, one representative figure of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism (Mou 1968, 115-189). Mou 
has devoted himself to the comparative study of Kant’s philosophy (e.g. the conception of autonomy, 
practical standpoint and intellectual intuition, among others) and Confucianism and thereby highlights 
the consensus shared particularly by Kant, Mencius, Lu Xiangshan and Wang Yangming, the so-called 
xin-xue (心學) tradition. This line of thought is likewise well elaborated and cemented by Mou’s 
disciple, Lee Ming-huei (See Lee 1990). In light of above analysis, comparative studies of Confucian 
and Kantian ethics could be regarded as the resource to churn out productive academic writings. 
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